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ABSTRACT 
The Domain Name Service (DNS) is a critical core component of the global 
Internet and integral to the majority of corporate intranets. It provides resolution 
services between the human-readable name-based system addresses and the 
machine operable Internet Protocol (IP) based addresses required for creating 
network level connections. Whilst structured as a globally dispersed resilient tree 
data structure, from the Global and Country Code Top Level Domains 
(gTLD/ccTLD) down to the individual site and system leaf nodes, it is highly 
resilient although vulnerable to various attacks, exploits and systematic failures.   
This paper examines the history along with the rapid growth of DNS up to its 
current critical status. It then explores the often overlooked value of DNS query 
data; from packet traces, DNS cache data, and DNS logs, with its use in System 
Forensics and more frequently in Network Forensics, extrapolating examples and 
experiments that enhance knowledge.  
Continuing on, it details the common attacks that can be used directly against the 
DNS systems and services, before following on with the malicious uses of DNS 
in direct system attacks, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), traditional Denial 
of Service (DOS) attacks and malware. It explores both cyber-criminal activities 
and cyber-warfare based attacks, and also extrapolates from a number of more 
recent attacks the possible methods for data exfiltration. It explores some of the 
potential analytical methodologies including; common uses in Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDS), as well as infection and activity tracking in malware traffic 
analysis, and covers some of the associated methods around technology designed 
to defend against, mitigate, and/or manage these and other risks, plus the effect 
that ISP and nation states can have by direct manipulation of DNS queries and 
return traffic.  
This paper also investigates potential behavioural analysis and time-lining, which 
can then be used for the development of automated analysis methods during 
forensic investigations and as DNS is a network protocol, there is a predomination 
towards network based attacks and discovery. It shows the breadth of possible 
attacks and the scope of investigative approaches that can be employed. 
Overall it is an exploration of the area of DNS in Computer Forensics, 
additionally providing a foundation for educational exploration and further 
subject research:  it concludes by bringing together all these aspects to support the 
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importance of DNS analysis in Computer Forensics. 
Keywords: DNS, Network Forensics, FQDN, Computer Forensics 
1. OVERVIEW 
The Domain Name Service (DNS) is a critical and core component of the global 
Internet and the majority of corporate intranets. It provides resolution services 
between human-readable name based addresses, e.g. URL's, and the machine 
operable IP addresses required for creating network level connections. This report 
explores the value of DNS query data in System and Network Forensics, as 
advocated by Gary Kessler, (1) and (2), as well as the malicious use of DNS in 
system attacks and malware, and some of the associated methods around the 
technologies to mitigate or manage the risks. As DNS is a network protocol, this 
report predominates towards network based attacks and discovery. It shows the 
breadth of possible attacks and the scope of investigative approaches that can be 
employed. 
2. ASSUMPTIONS 
It is recommended that the reader has a reasonable knowledge of Internet systems, 
computer forensics, Botnets and basic networking; an understanding of DNS 
inner functionality is not required. Detailed information is available from the 
book, DNS & Bind (3), published by O’Reilly. 
3. HISTORY 
3.1 Pre-DNS 
Internet communication could entirely exist using IP addresses; however general 
use as both a commercial and personal tool could not be achieved without human-
readable names for websites, and online services. The entire name-to-IP 
resolution system was originally based on a single hosts.txt file maintained by the 
Stanford Research Institute, (3 p. 3), distributed between systems administrators 
on the fledgling Internet by manual FTP.  Originally infrequently updated; the 
embryonic Internet outgrew this manual update method, with thousands of 
records in a single file.  
3.2 Foundation 
From Paul Mockapetris’ original architecture proposal in 1984 (FC’s 883 and 
884, (4), the DNS architecture grew to provide a distributed, de-centralised, 
hierarchical system for the name-to-IP resolution on a global basis, allowed the 
IPv4 Internet to grow (3 p. 4). Top level zones managed by different 
organisations, repeatedly delegate sections of the name-space. Blocks of domain 
space can then be readily traversed. Functionality therefore is resilient to missing 
data or systems at the edge nodes. Figure 1, below, shows an example of part of 
the top levels of the DNS system, and the subsequent delegation to sub 
organisations. 
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Figure 1 
 
3.3 Expansion 
Continued growth of the Internet, now incorporates both IPv6 and IPv4 
addressing, with “AAAA” and “IP6.ARPA” records having been registered by 
NIC’s as early as 2004 for the .jp domain, (5 p. 12). 
From the top-level ICANN  has assigned over 21 gTLD (generic Top Level 
Domains) zones, (6), and 250 ccTLD's (2-letter country specific top-level 
domains) zones, (6), on a core set of root-name-servers; large arrays of distributed 
systems posted at hundreds of key data exchange nodes on the Internet, (7), to 
individual company systems.   
Each countries registrar or NIC (Network Information Centre) is responsible for 
maintaining or sub-contracting the management of domain name registration and 
management policies.  Different registrars have different rules regarding identity, 
cost, responsibility, process, etc... E.g. Singapore requires a registration to be 
made by a company trading within the country and have a local registered 
company number; 
“A registrant in this category must be, at the point of application, a 
commercial entity and registered with Accounting and Corporate Regulatory 
Authority (ACRA), International Enterprise Singapore (IE Singapore) or any 
professional bodies.” (8) 
Other jurisdictions have almost no restrictions, and this makes certain domain 
suffixes particularly attractive to spammers and Botnet masters for use in their 
illegal services. 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 7(2) 
14 
ICANN chief, Rod Beckstrom commented regarding the security and continued 
stability of the domain name system globally; advising certain countries that they 
would be required to explain themselves for the wholesale criminal activity within 
their e-borders. 
“Parts of that system are only in your countries. I’m going to be writing you a 
letter and asking you for what is happening in the domain name system in 
your countries, because we’re seeing new levels of wildcarding that’s 
occurring at the telecom service provider level, synthesis of domain name 
system providers interrupting DNS requests and providing false data and 
information for commercial or other purposes.” (9) 
Furthermore the anti-spam group KnujOn reported that 162 of the global 
registrars were non-compliant with ICANN requirements for whois data, (10). 
These comments show an increased level of recognition at the highest echelons 
for the criticality and vulnerability of the DNS environment, and a willingness to 
use DNS as part of the control and detection infrastructure for criminal activity. 
3.4 Prevalence 
DNS is now the de-facto standard for Internet domain name resolution and it 
comprises millions of physical name servers, and just within the .com gTLD for 
one delegated registrar, there are almost 90 million active domains with over 315 
million names previously deleted, (11). They cite their top registrant as 
Domaincontrol.com who registered 34,592 domains during 12
th
 August 2010, 
deleted 23,553, and transferred 22,392 out to other parties, (12). From just one 
client of one registrar on one day; this is an extreme level of registration volume. 
Paul Vixie, President of Internet Systems Consortium Inc, writes that; 
 “Most new domain names are malicious. ... Every day lots of new names are 
added to the global DNS, and most of them belong to scammers, spammers, 
e-criminals, and speculators. The DNS industry has a lot of highly capable 
and competitive registrars and registries who have made it possible to reserve 
or create a new name in just seconds, and to create millions of them per day." 
(13) 
KnujOn continues in their full report regarding the prevalence of URLs selling 
fake pharmaceuticals; 
However, illicit product traffic presents an opportunity for Registrars to earn 
significant amounts money through illicit domain registrations and related 
domain product services. (14 p. 2) 
They continue grouping this seemingly small matter of registrar corruption and 
whois fraud, with larger more sinister illegal activities; 
“Additional security threats like malware deployment, denial of service 
attacks, trademark hijacking, botnets, spam, WHOIS fraud, network 
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intrusions, domain hijacking, Registrar corruption, and electronic money 
laundering are all tools of the global network of illicit drug traffic. Beyond the 
Internet this traffic impacts the health of the public while funding organized 
crime and terrorist groups.” (14 p. 2) 
These examples illustrate the scope of the problem of both crimes which use DNS 
and the sheer number of domains that any investigation must deal with at any 
time, and thus the likelihood of DNS related behaviour being relevant to an 
investigation. 
3.5 DNS Service 
The core name service software is based on the ISC BIND distribution, which is 
maintained as “a reference implementation of those protocols”, (15). Whilst primarily for Un*x 
and Un*x-like platforms, it is also present in many appliances, e.g. Infoblox, (16), 
and is a core component of Microsoft's AD server. DNS is therefore present in 
every domestic, academic, governmental and corporate network, via servers, 
routers and ADSL modems. The DHCP client software on a PC automatically 
receives DNS server details when allocated an IP address, (17).  For small 
networks, this is usually an upstream ISP's (Internet Service Provider) DNS cache 
resolver. 
DNS without DNSSEC extensions has no inherent security; it relies on TCP and 
UDP data connections across IP to the delegated servers and assumes that they are 
both available and accurate.  The protocol does not provide a means to detect 
DNS interception, and hence packets can be manipulated, as covered later in this 
paper. 
3.6 Overview 
As DNS is a core and prevalent component of the Internet, it is both a prime 
target for attack and a key source of information. The risks and the benefits are 
therefore from the distributed/delegated nature of the system, and its disparate 
implementations and standards. This readily allows for local collections of data, 
and delegated control, but also local influencing of results and sites. 
4. DNS IN FORENSICS 
Gary Kessler, writes; 
“Digital investigators have an increasing need to examine data networks and 
traffic, either as part of criminal or civil investigations or when responding to 
information security incidents. To truly understand the contents of the logs 
and the data packets, examiners need to have a good foundation in the 
protocols comprising the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP/IP) suite.” (2) 
4.1 Network Forensics 
Whilst it appears that most investigators prioritize their investigation by 
examining the HTTP traffic for the pages visited, the preliminary step of mapping 
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the DNS queries and responses and correlating them against subsequent traffic 
can reveal significant data regarding the activities of the “browser”; human or 
automated. 
4.1.1 DNS in Network Packet Captures 
Where complete packet captures are available, the DNS queries can be used to 
narrow down specific sections of a traffic dump, investigate query timings, or 
ascertain if HTTP requests are pre-seeded with connection IP addresses e.g. for 
spoofing attacks, or show failed domain lookups, or those issued as the result of 
non-human activity. 
4.1.2 Data in DNS Queries 
For each DNS transaction there is a query and a response. The query contains a 
single name or IP resolution request in a standard form, easily monitored by 
Wireshark and a “port 53” filter: 
First packet: Request a reverse (in-addr.arpa) resolution of the configured name 
server e.g. “158.43.204.4”, by using the query “PTR 4.204.43.158.in-addr.arpa”. 
If this section is captured, then it demonstrates that the query has been made from 
the command line, or has not already been cached on the PC by the local resolver. 
The “nslookup” command skips the local resolver and hosts file cache. 
Second packet: Reply from the upstream resolver containing the FQDN (Fully 
Qualified Domain Name), “cache0004.ns.eu.uu.net”. This demonstrates another 
useful type of information in domain names; the caching name server name 
reveals structural data about UUNet’s operation. In this case they divide their 
operation by region “eu.uu.net” and then by function “ns.eu.uu.net” and that they 
utilize multiple classes of name servers “cache”, in this case, as well as multiple 
instances “0004”. Whilst not directly relevant to the analysis of a specific PC’s 
behaviour, a sudden change in this data could indicate that the configured resolver 
has been changed.  Also if the IP address in the packet does not match the 
response, then the DNS connection could be being subverted. 
Third packet: Request for the resolution of the provided FQDN, e.g. 
“www.microsoft.com”, as an “A” record. 
Fourth packet: Usually the upstream name server then replies with multiple 
addresses, CNAMES, and their related “A” records.  This multiple record 
response reduces the number of subsequent queries sent by the client PC for the 
enumeration of a single address.  
Fifth packet: Repeats the request but for the IPV6 or “AAAA” query.  
Sixth packet: Returns the IPv6 address if available. 
Whilst a search for a non-existent record, e.g. “www” with no domain, produces 
the “No such name” response, and a recommendation that a root-name-server is 
consulted.  
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The existence of the IPv6 query shows that the PC has the IPv6 options enabled. 
If the PC’s DNS configuration is deliberately changed to include a search order of 
“zzxxxxxxzz.com”, “yyyyyyyyy.com” and “zzzzzzzzz.com”, Figure 2, then the 
response to an unqualified domain query is changed as shown in Figure 3.  
 
 
Figure 2 
Firstly “www.zzxxxxxxzz.com” is queried and fails, returning “No such name”, 
then “www.yyyyyyyyy.com” is checked and resolves (64.38.232.180). As this 
has resolved, “www.xxxxxxxx.com” is never checked. This reveals important 
data regarding the PC’s network configuration. 
 
Figure 3 
If enumerated over a number of queries all these entries may be identified and the 
configured search order ascertained. 
The behaviour of client DNS queries can be further examined by typing 
“www.google.com” in to a browser directly, which then generates a number of 
subsequent queries, Figure 4. Examining these queries and responses reveals how 
the site was accessed. Clicking on the link “images” at the top of the page then 
generates no further DNS queries. The suffix “.co.uk” in the reply for the typed 
suffix “.com” also shows the regionalization of the PC’s IP address or its’ ISP at 
that time via the Google load balancing system. 
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Figure 4 
If packet captures are taken external to the local DNS resolver, e.g. on a corporate 
gateway, then there are many more connections available, and furthermore if both 
“sides” of the DNS resolver (gateway) are observed, then the difference between 
client query and connections onwards to other DNS servers would indicate which 
entries are already in the DNS server cache. 
A lack of DNS queries for connections could be IP specific connections, these 
could be where malware has hardcoded IP addresses for command-and-control 
servers.  
No DNS queries for other HTTP traffic could indicate that the system has already 
connected to the remote server, and that the IP address is already cached, or that 
the FQDN is already recorded in the hosts file.  
The above examples, only touch the surface of the data that can be extrapolated 
from the DNS queries, whether the analysis is data based, temporal or another 
parameter. 
4.2 System Forensics 
4.2.1 System Hosts File 
The hosts file is consulted by the resolver during the first phase of resolution, and 
where a record exists, will preclude further queries to external systems. Many 
anti-virus and security applications routinely monitor this file for changes, and 
several anti-spyware tools pre-seed it with entries containing “127.0.0.x” 
addresses to foil some malware. Any records in this file should be examined in 
detail, especially relating to banks or known online systems. 
4.2.2 Registry Entry for DNS Settings 
For Windows the system registry contains the key, ‘HKLM\System\Current 
ControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\NameServer="A.B.C.D A.B.E.F”’, (18), 
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where “A.B.C.D” and “A.B.E.F” are the IP addresses of the allocated name 
servers. This should be checked to ensure it matches the expected network or 
DHCP settings. 
4.2.3 Resolv.conf 
For Linux is the /etc/resolv.conf file holds the DNS search suffixes and the 
assigned name servers.  On a DHCP system, this file may not be fully populated 
by the DHCP client script, therefore the file /etc/dhcp/resolv.conf needs to be 
checked. 
4.2.4 VPN Tunnels and Addition Network Interfaces 
Where a VPN tunnel is set up encompassing a particular network address block, it 
may be acting as a means to bypass the local ISP or networks name service, and 
hence change the resolution process. Additional network interfaces can be 
identified through the key and sub-keys of “HKLM\System\Current 
ControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Interfaces\ <Interface Name>”, (19). For 
Linux all network settings are stored in /etc/sysconfig/ network-scripts/<interface 
name> configuration files. 
4.2.5 DNScache Data 
The DNScache configuration is held in the registry key, 
“HKLM\System\CurrentControl Set\Services\DNScache”. From Windows the 
DNScache can be flushed to remove polluted cache entries using “ipconfig 
/flushdns”. The contents can be displayed using the command “ipconfig 
/displaydns” which will list all entries, often many hundreds. 
For a real-time analysis of the DNS cache by remotely querying it, Ed Skoudis 
advises, (20), that you can parse the running cache for specific entries using a 
predetermined file, names.txt, and a one line command. 
C:\> for /F %i in (names.txt) do @echo %i & nslookup -norecurse %i 
[DNSserver] | find "answer" & echo. 
This is based on the paper by Luis Grangeia, where he explains;  
"The most effective way to snoop a DNS cache is using iterative queries. One 
asks the cache for a given resource record of any type (A, MX, CNAME, 
PTR, etc.) setting the RD (recursion desired) bit in the query to zero. If the 
response is cached the response will be valid, else the cache will reply with 
information of another server that can better answer our query, or most 
commonly, send back the root.hints file contents." (21) 
Under Linux this would be, (20); 
for i in `cat names.txt`; do host -r $i [nameserver]; done 
For a Linux PC with a local caching name server, the DNS cache contents can be 
dumped using the command “rndc dumpdb -cache” which creates a file called 
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named_dump.db that can be read or interrogated. 
For a system with a local DNS cache, this is extremely useful for DNS query 
analysis; for DNS servers there is a larger volume of information, but this can be 
invaluable in tracing malware, and attacks. 
4.2.6 DNS server log files and statistics files 
On a Linux name server with logging enabled in the DNS service, the extensive 
file /var/named/chroot/var/named/named.log is created. This file is not rotated on 
service restart. It contains the time and date stamp and query of every domain 
lookup received.  
Such log files are usually contain too much data to read manually, therefore 
automated scripts should be used. ISPs maintain very large cache servers for their 
clients commonly known as “sump” servers, and their cache’s and logs can be 
used to produce a detailed picture of browsing and malware behaviour from their 
client base. These servers are almost never rebooted. 
System log files, can also contain information regarding zone transfers. Where it 
is suspected that a transfer has been polluted, and provide a record of the attack. 
Similarly Windows System and Security logs may contain critical data on 
changes made to the DNS environment. 
4.3 Attacks on DNS 
There are many attacks on DNS, some included below, for which detailed 
explanations can be found on various technical websites, including detailed 
analysis of Pharming methods by Gunter Ollmanns’ www.technicalinfo.net, (22). 
By studying the attacks it is possible to develop detection and investigation 
routines as demonstrated by the Conficker and Zeus analysis. Studies in Essen, 
(23), have shown that publishing DNS records is one of the most effective way of 
attracting malware and attacks to a honeynet for analysis. 
4.3.1 Modified Lookup Process 
By changing the contents of the hosts file, or by subverting the resolver DLL files, 
or by changing the DNS server settings on the network interface, or by creating a 
VPN tunnel with different VPN settings, the client PC can be caused to access 
alternative IP addresses for specific websites. This is usually detected by detailed 
analysis of the system configuration, and checking the file contents and/or hashes 
for files and DLL’s or a packet trace. 
Modifying the contents of the DHCP server, or inserting a rogue DHCP 
server/service in to the LAN allows the published DNS settings to be modified.  
This then allows arbitrary modification of DNS responses. Reviewing the 
contents of DHCP packets in network captures, and last connection entries in the 
registry on the system can be compared with expected settings. 
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4.3.2 Man-in-the-middle Attacks and DNS Spoofing 
Compromising routers, or network proxy servers, allows the DNS connections 
crossing the system to be modified, and the resultant connections to be redirected. 
Redirection of connections could be made to upstream or transparent proxy 
servers where man-in-the-middle attacks can additionally be made. Reviewing 
network security, network architecture, and web proxy settings, can reveal this 
form of attack. However analysis and comparison of external and internal DNS 
resolution requests, and identifying data mismatches can also reveal some of the 
aspects of these attacks.  
4.3.3 Domain Name Hijacking 
At the domain registrar level, the compromising of an email account, or 
administrative key (auth-key) can allow the delegation records for a domain to be 
redirected to alternative domain name servers, where the browser can be 
redirected to an alternative web site. Ramachandran used domain hijacking 
techniques on domains used by Bobax in 2005 to identify hosts sending spam 
trying to communicate back, (24). Detection of this attack is very difficult at the 
network level, and has to be analyzed using delegation and registrar tools, e.g. 
“dig” and “whois” as well as online search engines. 
Botnets often utilize thousands of domains, where the DNS delegation can be 
updated automatically, and these are then frequently changed to the current active 
set of zombie DNS servers, which each hold the current low TTL value zone 
records. c.f. Dynamic DNS and Fast Flux DNS below. 
4.3.4 Similar Domains Names 
Another common attack, exploiting the human weaknesses of spelling and typing 
and for use in phishing attacks and link attacks; an attacker registers a number of 
similar but misspelt zones and delegates them to name servers they control. 
Browsing to these addresses reaches the rogue website, which often proxies the 
real site, or uses the real sites embedded objects. Where the misspelt domain 
name is used in email phishing attacks, it can be detected by the consistent and 
repeated accesses to this misspelt site in DNS. 
4.3.5 DNS Wildcards 
Where the “*” field is used in a DNS zone file, it acts as a catchall for possible 
host records. These are not commonly used in normal DNS outside MX (Mail 
eXchanger) records for email processing, and hence were they are used for 
tracking purposes e.g. by Phishers, they are clearly visible in DNS logs and 
network captures, and useful for 4.11.4 Mobile Data Exfiltration. 
4.3.6 Poorly Managed DNS 
A common point for exploiting DNS is to use many of the known vulnerabilities 
in the DNS service daemons. Where DNS servers are not patched, or zero-day 
exploits can be utilized, the configuration of the DNS server can be changed and 
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traffic redirected. Variations on this attack include “zone file injection”, where a 
compromised zone file is added, and “root hints file changes”, where the file 
containing the details of the core root-name-servers are altered. Unless the 
compromised DNS server is checked in detail, or the compromising traffic is 
detected, this can be very difficult to detect. Comparison of direct DNS queries 
and DNS delegation checks will though reveal the discrepancies against the 
compromised server for the specific domains affected. 
4.3.7 DNS Server Denial of Service 
Denial of Service (DoS) on a DNS server, includes taking the server or the service 
offline, either through a direct crash, or by flooding the server with bogus 
connections. This will cause a redirect for all the clients to their secondary name 
server and slow down the client PC, but may allow the attacker to redirect the 
connections to a compromised secondary DNS server. Detection of DoS attacks 
can be difficult, and research is examining the effectiveness of Neural Networks, 
(25). Examining the search order on the PC and comparing to captured network 
traffic, or examining the failed outbound connections to the primary server will 
identify this scenario.  
4.3.8 DNS Cache Poisoning 
Where the DNS server is vulnerable to any of the available cache security 
vulnerabilities, an attacker can inject a fake DNS record in to the existing cache 
file. This is then propagated through any DNS servers downstream that use this 
compromised host as a cache-resolver.  Where Fast-Flux DNS is used with a 
Botnet, then the server may be repeatedly attacked with low TTL value records to 
pollute the cache. Where a record is intended to be cached for an extended period, 
e.g. Denial of service via cache poisoning, then a large TTL will be provided. 
This is particularly difficult to resolve, as the DNS caching server will only clear 
the record on restart, or when the TTL expires.  A scan of 2.5 million DNS 
servers by Dan Kaminsky in 2005, (26), showed that more than 230,000 servers 
were vulnerable to just one type of cache poisoning threat. 
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5. DNS Request
(www.google.com)
6. Reply
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Figure 5 
Figure 5, above, shows the data flows of a cache-poisoning attack.  Where the 
attacker first requests a valid DNS name (1), and the cache server queries that 
from a compromised but authoritative name server (2), the reply (3) contains both 
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the requested data, and an additional record (or records) to poison the cache. The 
original data is returned to the requester (4). When a future client requests the 
poisoned record (5) they get the corrupted data (6) which is already in the cache.  
In 1997 Eugene Kashpureff may have used an early form of this attack against 
large numbers of DNS servers as an apparent marketing ploy or protest attack 
against Internic, redirecting all traffic to his Alternic site. He faced federal 
charges, (27), before pleading guilty, and received a 5 year suspended sentence, 
(28). 
To investigate these attacks it is possible to manually follow the DNS delegation 
path to ensure that the correct DNS records can be established.  When monitoring 
replies from suspected poisoned caches, compare current published TTL’s with 
those in the cache server.  Very high and very low TTL values should be 
suspicious, where most DNS records are 900 to 7200 seconds, occasionally as 
high as 172800 seconds for some records, and occasionally as low as 15 seconds 
for some load-balanced services.  Other values in packet captures or replies 
should be examined closely. Cached entries may remain for hours/days after an 
attack has been mitigated. 
4.3.9 DNS ID Spoofing 
DNS ID spoofing is where the attacker tries to predict the DNS transaction ID for 
a given query that will be sent outbound from the cache server. The attacker then 
floods the server with spoofed reply UDP packets in the hope that the ID number 
is matched and a spoofed packet is accepted before the real reply is received. If 
the attacker has access to the local network, then the ID can be sniffed from the 
query packet and hence immediately spoofed. 
In mid 2008 Dan Kaminsky advised of a new flaw present in nearly all current 
name servers across the world, (29).  Patches were swiftly released and automated 
tools, Figure 6, are available to verify currently exposure. 
        
Figure 6 
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The left-hand imageFigure 6 clearly shows a well configured server whose port 
numbers and DNS ID’s cannot readily be predicted. However the right-hand 
imageError! Reference source not found. shows data for a server which is at 
substantial risk, in this case due to the use of the stanza “query-source address * 
port 53;” in the /var/named/chroot/etc/named.conf file. This attack is an 
additional way to create poisoned cache records, andcan be detected in the cache 
by the same mechanisms as above, however this attack is more readily detected at 
the network level by monitoring for these spoofed replies. 
4.3.10 Birthday Attack 
The effectiveness of the above attack can be improved, as detailed by Ollmann; 
“This repetitive behaviour means that a “Birthday Paradox” could be used to 
mathematically increase the speed and probability of a successful attack by 
reducing the number of spoofed guesses of the DNS transaction ID from tens 
of thousands down to a few hundred.” (22)  
4.4 Identifying Behaviour 
As outlined in the Network Analysis above and in the attacks on DNS directly, 
the data at the packet level is critical to identifying behaviour. 
DNS queries can be used to narrow down a search to a specific section of a 
network traffic dump, or to investigate query timings, or to ascertain if HTTP 
requests are pre-seeded with connection IP addresses e.g. for spoofing attacks, or 
to indicate failed domain lookups, or those issued as the result of non-human 
activity, or as a passive system consequence, or tracking the behaviour of 
software update tools. The DNS queries made by corporate PC’s when they are 
off-network can reveal internal domain names, IP’s and addresses of 
management, reporting and logging servers.  
However when investigating DNS traffic, it is best to take a larger view with an 
understanding of how and when browsers, for instance, cause the PC operating 
system to make a DNS request.  
4.4.1 Timeline 
For example; taking all the DNS replies from a 24 hour period in Wireshark, 
saving them out as text based packets, and filtering for the reply header, domain 
name and the time to live. Then filtering with a simple Perl script and returning 
the sorted data to Excel for graphical processing. Figure 7 shows the offset TTL 
versus domain name in request order, with the domain names text suppressed at 
this level. 
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Figure 7 
This high-level view contains 2000 line items of data, and could readily be 
“drilled-down” to specific times or filtered by URLs. It is already apparent that 
there are different TTL’s on different domain names, and that some low-level 
DNS activity is happening continuously (slopes in graph). Periods of peak activity 
can also be identified. This analysis should form part of any investigation where 
the data is available. 
4.5 Tracking Malware 
The key to detection is monitoring the DNS server logs to spot Malware events, 
which for investigative purposes correlates with log reviews and traffic captures.  
4.5.1 Hard-Coded IPs 
Looking for HTTP or other transactions which are NOT preceded by DNS 
requests can be a key sign of malware activity, (30). Malware is often pre-seeded 
with connection targets and peer-to-peer nodes for which DNS lookups are not 
required. 
4.5.2 Dynamic DNS (DDNS) 
A particular feature of many of the DNS aware Botnets is the use of Dynamic 
DNS records. Here either the DNS is directly manipulated within the Botnet, via 
the hosting of delegated DNS servers on zombie hosts, or though third party 
DDNS servers.  This allows a malware site to frequently move location. Given the 
usual time-lag between seizure and investigation, the DNS logs and network 
captures are the only place to identify this changing data. 
4.5.3 Fast Flux DNS 
An extension of DDNS is the use of Fast Flux methods; here the DNS records are 
changed on every transaction by setting a TTL of 0 or 1 seconds and hence 
requiring the client to re-lookup the remote address. This is commonly used now 
0 20
,0
0
0
40
,0
0
0
60
,0
0
0
80
,0
0
0
10
0,
0
00
12
0,
0
00
14
0,
0
00
16
0,
0
00
18
0,
0
00
20
0,
0
00
22
0,
0
00
24
0,
0
00
26
0,
0
00
28
0,
0
00
30
0,
0
00
32
0,
0
00
34
0,
0
00
36
0,
0
00
38
0,
0
00
40
0,
0
00
42
0,
0
00
44
0,
0
00
46
0,
0
00
48
0,
0
00
50
0,
0
00
52
0,
0
00
54
0,
0
00
56
0,
0
00
58
0,
0
00
60
0,
0
00
62
0,
0
00
64
0,
0
00
66
0,
0
00
68
0,
0
00
70
0,
0
00
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 7(2) 
26 
in Botnets to continually move services around the Botnet cloud. Such regularly 
changing DNS records should be seen as a clear sign in any packet capture or log 
of an active Botnet on the network. Even load balanced critical infrastructure does 
not regularly change its’ IP addresses in this way. 
4.5.4 Conficker 
ICANN recently published a report, (31), detailing how the DNS traffic generated 
by the Conficker worm was tracked and investigated.  This represents a 
significant turning point in counter-worm activities and network forensic analysis, 
even when we consider most modern Botnets have moved to P2P 
communications, this change is largely as a result of this and similar investigative 
and reactive activities. 
In summary, the global registrars, law enforcement, ICANN and other parties 
came together to lock down, pre-register and sinkhole as many as possible of the 
hundreds of algorithmically generated DNS names being used by the Conficker 
zombie processes to connect to the command and control infrastructure, 
effectively cutting them off from the main Botnet Command and Control servers. 
This use of DNS by the malware authors was to mitigate the risk of network (IP) 
level takedown of Command and Control systems where they would otherwise be 
hardcoded in to the malware. These DNS records should be considered as 
“Rendezvous Logic Points”, and were typically registered just a few hours before 
use for the Botnet malware. 
As a result of the effectiveness of this campaign spanning just the core TLD’s, 
was a broadening of the DNS name scope in subsequent variants of the malware. 
This required a similar broadening by the ICANN team in their contacts with 
ccTLD and gTLD registrars. Piscitello summarizes below the criticality of DNS 
in the forensic effort against the malware: 
“The combined efforts of all parties involved in the collaborative response 
should be measured by more criteria than mitigation alone. The containment 
measures did not eradicate the worm or dismantle the botnet entirely. Still, the 
coordinated operational response merits attention because the measures 
disrupted botnet command and control communications and caused Conficker 
malware writers to change their behaviour. The collaborative effort also 
demonstrated that security communities are willing and able to join forces in 
response to incidents that threaten the security and stability of the DNS and 
domain registration systems on a global scale.” (31) 
4.5.5 Cutwail, Ozdok and Zeus 
First looking at the correlation of Spam and sending domains using DNS 
correlation and whois searches, Chun Wei and colleagues found a strong direct 
correlation, (32). Willa Ehrlich from AT&T Labs later published a paper on their 
investigation of SMTP spamming malware using network flow data and DNS 
metadata, (33). By profiling legitimate SMTP traffic against traffic generated by a 
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spamming Botnet, and using entropy based analysis of hosts behaviour to identify 
zombie systems. Then for these identified systems, the command and control 
connections were enumerated using traffic modelling, periodicity and recurrence 
analysis. Once suspected, the DNS metadata was passively replicated and then 
analyzed for suspected abuse of the DNS protocol. This was achieved across the 
AT&T Internet backbone. Ehrlich describes this analysis as follows (reformatted 
for clarity): 
“The DNS analysis of the IP address of the suspected controller provides the 
following output:  
i. count of all domains resolved to the address historically,  
ii. count of domains that resolved to the address recently (e.g., 
last 1 day), 
iii. number of transient domains related to the suspect address. 
Transient domains are domains that migrate frequently 
between diverse provider addresses, indicating an evasion 
effort.  
To determine the transiency of a domain we consider the average time 
overlap between addresses for the same domain and the diversity of the 
addresses in terms of AS numbers and IP registration data.” (33) 
This is perhaps one of the clearest and most concise examples of DNS forensics 
against real-time network packet captures, and should be used as a model going 
forwards for other similar analysis. However even the most basic spam analysis 
involves DNS analysis of email headers, (34). 
4.5.6 DNSscraper 
On a smaller scale, Ben Jackson created, published and updated a program called 
“zeusdnsscraper.pl”, (35). This simple system uses a non-recursive DNS query, 
discussed earlier, to query the domain name server for entries in the Zeus Tracker 
Domain Block List, (36). Any hits could then be investigated back to client PC’s 
to contain any infection of the Botnet on the network. This can of course be 
expanded to any other Botnet or domain required. 
4.5.7 Logs, Caches and Trends 
As described in detail above, 4.3 Attacks on DNSthere are many known 
subversion methods for DNS data payloads. Actively looking for these trends and 
connection signatures, e.g. with an IDS system, greatly increases the chance of 
detecting and mitigating malware infections, or detecting malware activity. 
Some host based IDS and firewall software contains firewall rule-bases or packet 
level transaction logs, which can be similarly used. Mapping DNS query packets 
against known TTL's and subsequent data connections will also highlight relevant 
issues. 
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4.6 Trojan Defence 
More directly, when faced with a proposed “Trojan Defence”, the data in DNS 
logs, records, caches and hosts files may prove invaluable in proving or 
disproving the underlying hypothesis. The signatures for malware are well known 
and can be readily enumerated if the data exists. 
4.7 Penetration Testing 
The tools used for penetration testing may be useful in analysis, or may be used as 
part of an attack being investigated. Below, examined briefly, are a small number 
of interesting DNS related testing tools and methods: 
4.7.1 DNS Mapping 
The DNSMAP tool, (37), is a prime example of a tool that forms the basis of a 
penetration test, allowing the wholesale mapping of DNS zones, whois data and 
other domain related information. This tool includes sub-domain brute-forcing for 
the enumeration of hosts and sub-domain records from a name server. The 
importance of whois and methodologies for investigation are covered by Bruce 
Nikkel, UBS, (38). 
4.7.2 Fierce 2.0 
Fierce, (39), is a DNS mapping tool for aggressively enumerating, DNS zones via 
the name server and many other databases. It is capable of enumerating AS 
numbers, ARIN tables, whois data as well as standard DNS zones. 
4.7.3 Information Discovery 
Matt via his Attack Vector blog, (40), published a discussion of corporate 
information discovery methods which underpin the two above tools. This shows 
how readily information can leak and the importance of the DNS and DNS-
related databases. 
4.7.4 Information Leakage 
Further information on the leakages of possible internal IP space through external 
corporate DNS servers is presented by dd, (41), giving examples of IP addresses 
extracted from DNS names inside Dell, Cisco, Facebook and even the SANS 
Institute. 
4.7.5 Future Mapping 
As IPv6 substantially increases the IP space available and is deployed inside a 
corporate network, brute forcing DNS domains in IPv6 will replace ping sweeps 
in future attacks and penetration tests. All networks will need to be in internal 
private DNS to function, so attacking the DNS zones and enumerating them 
becomes the best option. Van Hauser writes; 
“DNS Servers will become primary sources of information => primary 
targets”, (42) 
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4.8 DNS in Attacks 
In addition to those 4.3 Attacks on DNS explored above, there are a number of 
uses of DNS in other attacks presented below: 
4.8.1 DNS Rebinding 
According to Jeremiah Grossman, (43), 4 of the top 15 new types of attack 
developed in 2009 used DNS rebinding in some way. DNS Rebinding, (44), uses 
XSS (Cross-Site Scripting) and DNS vulnerabilities to pollute DNS data in the 
client resolver. By getting the user to access a compromised site, which provides a 
fake cookie for the intended target site, then rebinding the DNS record of the 
compromised site to that of the target site, the browser can be forced to access the 
target site with the XSS shell code from the compromised site. This can be used 
for spamming and scraping attacks on websites, (45). RSnake also explains in 
detail how a session fixation attack can be carried out using session cookies, 
compromised DNS servers and very low TTL’s, (46), and then extends this 
further to credential brute force attacks, (47). 
This shows the extensive scope for leveraging DNS rebinding, in this case, to 
enable other forms of attack, e.g. against the admin interface of domestic ADSL 
routers, (48). However, detecting this attack can be difficult without looking at 
both DNS data and web session cookies, or working closely with the site address 
and the host header referenced against DNS. Defeating it however, is achieved 
through the use of SSL and TLS connections as proposed by David Ross, (49). 
4.8.2 Attacking Google 
Google, who recently suffered a very high profile attack, presented details of their 
investigation to the FIRST (Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams) 
Conference 2010 in Miami. Heather Adkins revealed;  
“The security team also found the use of a hard coded DNS server. When the 
attackers conducted reconnaissance, they performed DNS queries, data which 
was useful in the investigation, Adkins said.  
The team searched for hosts and the DNS queries, building a picture of the 
scope of the attack. Concentrated DNS queries in a specific place represented 
invasive operations, she said. Most traffic mainly reaches out to common 
sites. A warning sign is when traffic is detected going to a new website that 
was recently registered and no one had visited before.  
"DNS query logs may be the only method you have to find new generations 
of malware," she said. "The adversary will need to reach other systems to 
install that malware. We often look for the big [anomalies], but we have to 
monitor for the subtle too." “(50). 
This clearly demonstrates the criticality of DNS logs and registrant data when 
investigating an attack. 
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4.9 ISP DNS Manipulation 
Whilst technically not an attack; it is important to ensure during any investigation 
that the role of the ISP and their DNS servers is fully understood. There are many 
examples where ISP’s manipulate DNS, effectively using man-in-the-middle and 
wildcarding techniques to achieve specific aims, usually advertising. 
4.9.1 Advertising Injection 
An area of contention exists with the manipulation of DNS replies for non-
existent domains, to display advertising pages. This came to a head when BT was 
accused of illegal monitoring of users communications with the Phorm trial, (51).  
Whilst advertising injection remains a questionable practice, it is entirely 
facilitated by DNS manipulation on the ISP’s name servers. 
4.9.2 YouTube Censorship 
Many countries insist on filtering the Internet due to political requirements, 
censorship directives, or differences in legal statutes. Turkey for example heavily 
censors approximately 4000 websites, including access to YouTube and recently 
added Google to the list, (52). Manipulating client DNS settings can be used in 
some jurisdictions to circumvent this control as explained by Ozan Tuzun in 
Jonathan Heads article, (52). 
4.9.3 Great Firewall of China. 
Part of the government censorship system in China for all Internet traffic, it filters 
DNS and controls how sites like Facebook or Twitter are resolved.  An “attack” 
need not therefore be malicious or deliberately directed; sections of DNS can be 
impacted by issues with root-name-servers where such censorship is applied to 
traffic from or for countries outside of the censorship zone. For example Chile 
and parts of the US suffered a loss of several sites due to such an issue on an 
independent root-name-server hosted in China, (53).  
4.10 Proactive Methods 
A number of technologies are now emerging which will change the nature of 
DNS, increasing security and reliability with the aim to reduce the attack and 
exploit surface for cyber-criminals and protect the end-user. 
4.10.1 DNSSEC 
DNSSEC Validator is an alpha-release plug-in to Firefox that allows the browser 
to display if a domain is secured by DNSSEC and whether those checks were 
successful, (54). When a page is browsed using this plug-in, the user can check to 
verify the page has not been spoofed. Zones can readily be secured using online 
tools, e.g. security-dns.net (55), and implementations of OpenDNSSec, (56). Care 
must be taken with system and key management however and ensuring keys are 
not allowed to expire or further issues can arise, as concluded by George 
Michaelson and colleagues, (57), in their article for the Internet Protocol Journal; 
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“It is an inherent quality of the DNSSEC deployment that in seeking to 
prevent lies, an aspect of the stability of the DNS has been weakened. When a 
client falls out of synchronization with the current key state of DNSSEC, it 
will mistake the current truth for an attempt to insert a lie. The subsequent 
efforts of the client to perform a rapid search for what it believes to be a 
truthful response could reasonably be construed as a legitimate response, if 
indeed this instance was an attack on that particular client. Indeed, to do 
otherwise would be to permit the DNS to remain an untrustable source of 
information. However, in this situation of slippage of synchronized key state 
between client and server, the effect is both local failure and the generation of 
excess load on external servers—and if this situation is allowed to become a 
common state, it has the potential to broaden the failure state to a more 
general DNS service failure through load saturation of critical DNS servers.” 
(57) 
4.10.2 Sump Caching  
As could be seen from the previously reviewed Conficker defence paper, (31), 
pre-seeding or proactively seeding DNS zones can greatly reduce the 
effectiveness of malware. Using key sump-caches and deliberately injecting such 
records on a global basis is another effective way of debilitating malware. It has to 
be achieved on a global scale, which is where organisations like DNS-CERT and 
ICANN have a potentially key coordination role.  
4.10.3 Sinkhole 
A DNS Sinkhole, as released recently by the SANS ISC (Internet Storm Center), 
is an example of a preconfigured DNS sump-cache-resolver, Bruneau explains;  
“It is a ready to install DNS Sinkhole server for those who would like to test 
and/or deploy one in their network as an internal forwarder. I also indicated 
that inserting a DNS sinkhole in a network is like putting a NIDS/NIPS inline 
with potentially several thousand signatures (DNS domains). After you 
loaded your DNS sinkhole list, it hijacks the client’s DNS requests to known 
malicious sites responding with an IP address you control instead of its true 
address. It could also be used to enforce corporate policies (hacking, adults, 
gaming, social, etc) with the creation of separate sinkhole lists.” (58) 
allowing any corporate network to deploy such a device trivially. The use of such 
sinkholes has been widely discussed over several years and used extensively 
against Botnets, (59) , but this is a significant development in operability and 
potential of this technology. 
4.10.4 DNSBL 
DNSBL‘s (DNS Black Lists) are used by anti-spam engines to monitor, track and 
publish in a resolvable manner IP addresses and domain names for use by the 
email filters. They are RBL’s (Real-time Black Lists) published via DNS to 
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reduce the size of the databases downloaded by subscribers and improve the 
response time. Any host appearing on a block list is then ignored by a subscribing 
SMTP mail server, and cannot exchange suspected SPAM email. Jeff Makey 
compares and contrasts different blacklists and their effectiveness, (60).  
Anirudh Ramachandran explains how the combination of honey-trap, sinkhole, 
and DNSBL could be used to profile the network-level behaviour of spammers, 
(24). 
4.11 Cutting Edge 
4.11.1 DNS-CERT 
The attacks on global or corporate DNS infrastructure are now considered so 
serious that there have been active discussions about creating an emergency alert 
and reaction network around the global DNS infrastructure, (61). Paul Vixie, 
recently proposed the creation of a DNS-CERT (Community Emergency 
Response Team), (62), to create just such a global cooperative of DNS NOC's to 
monitor and react to threats to the DNS landscape. This has received wide spread 
support, and is expected to be closely related to an existing DNS-OARC 
framework and models. He proposes the following model; 
‘DNSCERT should be a joint venture across the entire DNS industry, and the 
24x7 "watch floor" should be distributed across the globe. Much of the 
technical and operations work should be outsourced to the participants, who 
by running a tool set in common and doing training in common including 
sending personnel to DNSCERT HQ on a quarterly or annual rotation, will 
form an extremely robust and redundant asset base for the DNSCERT 
function.’ (63) 
ICANN have responded with findings from their 2010 DNS-CERT workshop, to 
directly address current issues; 
“The purpose of the exercise was to discuss various scenarios, and identify 
how the members of the community around the table presently respond to an 
array of Internet and DNS security threats, such as malicious names, malware 
using DNS, denial of service attacks, and security issues involving domain 
names, registry and registrar operations.” (64) 
This shows that the industry takes these matters very seriously and is using the 
expertise and techniques, many of which are outlined above, not just to 
investigate issues, but to improve the security and stability of this critical system.  
4.11.2 RPZ 
At the Black Hat Conference July 2010 Paul Vixie presented DNS-RPZ, (13), 
also known as Response Policy Zones, where owners of DNS resolvers can 
subscribe to and exchange reputation information regarding DNS resolvers and 
their domains. This was expected to be incorporated in to the mainstream BIND 
code in the October 2010.  This proposal has already generated much discussion, 
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and whilst embryonic, it has the potential to allow greater classification of 
criminal activity, and low-reputation behaviour. If incorporated into browser 
software, this would reduce some phishing sites effectiveness in a manner similar 
to DNSSEC. 
As with any such additional control, the technology moves the cybercrime 
problem from one area to another. Whilst this is beneficial to many large 
organisations, it does not help the community environment of the Internet where 
these reputational systems would be ill-equipped to cope with such small user 
communities. This would however be effective against the short-lived domains 
prevalent in Botnets, but likely be over-ridden by the impact on less well known, 
private user systems. 
4.11.3 Client IP 
As part of the extensions proposed by Google and UltraDNS to the existing DNS 
protocol, they would like to see the clients IP address passed as part of the DNS 
request. Ostensibly for DNS load balancing, (65), if implemented this would 
provide further data within the protocol for the positive identification of the client 
PC and protect against a number of the flood attacks, permitting client connection 
verification and tracking. How this would function with the largely NAT-ted 
network environments of most organisations and ADSL networks has not yet 
been disclosed. It would require a fundamental change to DNS masquerading 
techniques to avoid the default 192.168.1.2 domestic PC address being seen by 
the global DNS servers.  
4.11.4 Mobile Data Exfiltration 
Chris Wysopal, CTO of Veracode, presenting at the 2010 SCForum, (66), 
explained how mobile devices, which are fundamentally PC's in a small case, use 
IP connectivity and hence DNS requests for much of their non-call based 
functionality. With the growth of Android, Windows Mobile, Blackberry and 
other advanced mobile platforms, the market has grown to a ubiquitous Internet 
delivered environment.   
Where device-based malware may be harvesting data, phone numbers for 
example, their outbound connectivity may be closely controlled by access control 
structures inside the mobile OS and additional security software. In this scenario, 
DNS is usually an allowed protocol; therefore the data being exfiltrated by these 
malware programs can be encapsulated in the DNS packet space, or as part of the 
query. Where the malware author controls their own DNS servers, this becomes 
trivial to implement. 
This does not just affect the mobile market, DNS exfiltration appears to be a 
superb way of bypassing most controls.  Where wildcard DNS zones are created 
and malware hosting DNS servers run by the malware authors, the potential for 
data loss is unlimited.  Where “space” in the protocol is used, this may be limited 
by deep packet inspecting firewalls and IDS, but hiding this data in the DNS 
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resolution request would be trivial and largely hidden in the huge global volume 
of DNS traffic. E.g. “Standard query A gold1230.miscreant.ac”, could communicate the 
current $1230 futures price for gold to a name server hosting “miscreant.ac” 
under the Ascension Islands ccTLD. 
This closely matches the communications channels used by previous malware 
such as Loki, as discussed by Hal Bergal, (67). 
4.11.5 Malware Hash Register (MHR) 
Team Cymru have proposed the publication and maintenance of a free for use 
non-commercial licensed, software hash database for use by forensic examiners, 
and to publish this via a query based DNS system.  
“The Malware Hash Registry (MHR) project is a look-up service similar to 
the Team Cymru IP address to ASN mapping project. This project differs 
however, in that you can query our service for a computed MD5 or SHA-1 
hash of a file and, if it is malware and we know about it, we return the last 
time we've seen it along with an approximate anti-virus detection 
percentage.”(68) 
This shows an innovative use of DNS for the management and manipulation of 
hash data for use in forensic analysis. Whilst greatly expanding the size of DNS, 
this shows the power, and through that, the risk of such a global database 
structure. 
5. CONCLUSION 
This report clearly shows that the DNS protocol is both critical and vulnerable. It 
is at the core of all global networks and is the one function that maps the human-
readable ‘face’ of the internet to the complex machine-operable ‘IP’ world of 
routers and servers.  It is allowed through almost all firewalls globally and is 
generally implicitly considered to be trustworthy by end-use systems and hence 
the end-users. There are few people within the technical arena who truly 
understand both the DNS protocol and the above detailed risks. Many such 
parties, Kaminsky, Vixie, RSnake, Morrow, Arends, Liu, and the team at 
Columbia Tech, etc are repeatedly cited in this report or in the other articles 
referenced. 
The vulnerability of DNS as a whole and end-user systems specifically has been 
clearly shown, and furthermore expanded to demonstrate some of the techniques 
and practices that enable forensic investigations to be carried out, within, using, 
and on the DNS infrastructure. 
DNS logs, where captured, have value in confirming browsing behaviour versus 
malware behaviour, identifying system configuration, as well as providing time-
line data for investigations. DNS is therefore an immensely versatile and valuable 
resource. 
It should be noted that many of the techniques and investigations listed above are 
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shared between system/network forensics, intrusion detection/prevention, 
proactive system monitoring, system/network management, and procedural 
controls.  This should not be seen as a dilution of the information, but instead 
reinforce the criticality of DNS data and the integral part it plays in all 
communication. 
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